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INTRODUCTION

This Essay proposes a very specific strategy for leveraging
Opportunity Zone (OZ) funding to alleviate poverty, limit the harms
of gentrification, and support the expansion of income-generating
opportunities in OZs. The strategy builds on important work in
urban cores that has been ongoing for decades. Briefly described, this
Essay proposes significantly greater regulatory and programmatic
support for community banks to leverage OZ funding to support local
business networks. Part I of this Essay describes the importance of
local business networks as drivers of poverty alleviation and economic
development in urban cores, a good number of which have been
designated as OZs. Part I argues that OZ funding should support
such networks, and further that community banks have the potential
to play a uniquely powerful role in these efforts. Part II of this Essay

*
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Policy and Urban Affairs, Northeastern University. I am grateful to Nestor Davidson
for inspiring me to think about the connections between collaborative capitalism and
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proposes a regulatory approach for enhancing opportunities for
community banks to fulfill this potential.
At the outset, it is important to state a core assumption underlying
this Essay that I and others have elaborated elsewhere in broader
discussions of poverty alleviation and economic development.1 The
assumption begins with the recognition that the goals and strategies
for poverty alleviation and local economic development can and do
regularly conflict. It also acknowledges that the OZ program and
predecessor programs such as the Clinton-era Empowerment Zones
program may well have articulated the coequal prioritization of both
goals, but that in practice they have prioritized economic
development.2 By contrast, this Essay assumes that it will be
necessary for the OZ program to explicitly prioritize poverty
alleviation above economic development.3 This Essay’s focus,
therefore, is on programmatic and regulatory reforms to the OZ
program that enhance its ability to alleviate poverty in areas
designated as OZs.
I. COLLABORATIVE BUSINESS NETWORKS IN OPPORTUNITY
ZONES AND THE VALUE ADDED BY COMMUNITY BANKS

Despite the newness of the Opportunity Zone program, there is
already a growing consensus that OZ funding is not currently
reaching those who most need it and would benefit from it.4 This is
because, as presently structured, OZs are too indirect a mechanism

1. See generally RASHMI DYAL-CHAND, COLLABORATIVE CAPITALISM IN
AMERICAN CITIES: REFORMING URBAN MARKET REGULATIONS (2018) (discussing
extensively, especially in Chapter 3, the reasons underlying this assumption and the
literature discussing such reasons).
2. See Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1344
(1993).
3. See DYAL-CHAND, supra note 1, at 57. For discussions of the goals of
community development organizations, see WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL
POLICY 3–5 (2002); Rashmi Dyal-Chand & James V. Rowan, Developing

Capabilities, Not Entrepreneurs: A New Theory for Community Economic
Development, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 851–52, 894 (2014); Scott L. Cummings,
Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots
Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 400–02 (2001); Michael E.
Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June
1995,
https://hbr.org/1995/05/the-competitive-advantage-of-the-inner-city
[https://perma.cc/DN39-UGTZ].
4. Robert Frank, ‘Opportunity Zones’ Fall Short on Helping Low-Income
Communities, Study Finds, CNBC (June 17, 2020, 12:50 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/17/opportunity-zones-fall-short-on-helping-lowincome-communities-study.html [https://perma.cc/AHP5-QQ4R].
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for poverty alleviation. They rely too much on the assumption that
investments in larger businesses without direct ties to neighborhoods
designated as OZs will spread the benefits of those investments to
local residents.5 In reality, according to a mid-2020 report:
Almost 97% of the more than $10 billion raised by opportunity
funds so far has been raised by funds focused on commercial or
residential real estate . . . . Much of that money likely will be spent
on projects that have been in the works for years and have a high
expected return, such as high-end apartment buildings.6

A recent, detailed analysis by Michelle Layser supports this
conclusion.7 Analyzing data from the New Markets Tax Credit
(NMTC) program, Layser concludes that both the NMTC program
and the OZ program will likely produce “inefficient and inequitable”
outcomes, often because they invest in gentrifying neighborhoods.8
In short, the OZ program assumes too much that beneficial spillovers
will occur from investments tied only to geography.9
Reports such as this indicate that it is imperative that the OZ
program be reformed to provide substantial investments directly to

5. A 2020 Urban Institute report notes, “The OZ incentive is distinctive in
that . . . it allows [Qualified Opportunity Funds] to self-certify, meaning they are not
required to have a social-impact mission, nor to be governed or advised by
community members . . . . [T]he OZ program provides no opportunity for citizen
input about proposed projects, or even a role for a state or local government . . . to
prioritize the types of projects that should receive incentives once the state
government has selected its Zones.” BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URB. INST., AN EARLY
ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS:
NINE OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF THE INCENTIVE TO DATE 12 (2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102348/early-assessment-ofopportunity-zones-for-equitable-development-projects.pdf
[https://perma.cc/884AQB65].
6. Sophie Quinton, Black Businesses Largely Miss Out on Opportunity Zone
Money, PEW (June 24, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2020/06/24/black-businesses-largely-miss-out-on-opportunityzone-money [https://perma.cc/9U3Y-4P6V].
7. Michelle D. Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification: A Spatial Analysis of PlaceBased Tax Incentives, UC IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 60).
8. Id. (finding “the Opportunity Zones law overwhelmingly rewards profit
motive and are more likely than NMTC investors to actively seek profit opportunities
in gentrifying areas”).
9. As one commentator recently observed about Opportunity Zones: “The
initial idea was that they’re going to be opportunity zones, and that it would be
targeted towards low- and moderate-income communities, and it is by geography, but
by no other targeting.” Lydia O’Neal & David Hood, Local Lenders Stay Sidelined
as Cash Flows to Opportunity Zones, BLOOMBERG TAX (Nov. 30, 2020, 4:46 AM),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/local-lenders-stay-sidelined-as-cashflows-to-opportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/ME47-4S4W] (quoting Michael Swack,
director of the University of New Hampshire’s Center for Impact Finance).
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the long-time residents of OZs.
Furthermore, such financial
investments must include investments not only in housing but also in
the development of local jobs and other income-generating
opportunities. While affordable housing is crucial, the OZ program
(like the Enterprise Zones and Empowerment Zones programs
before it) must play a significant role in providing long-term financial
support for the development of stable, income-generating
opportunities.10 In particular, as has been argued elsewhere, by
supporting small, local businesses started and owned by local
residents, such programs can provide deep systemic support for the
creation and maintenance of local jobs, career ladders, and local
business ownership.11
Given its limitations as a tax benefit program, it is good news that
OZ investments do not have to be made on a blank canvas. The
primary task of the OZ program need not be to find market
opportunities and support the creation of new businesses or business
clusters. Successful small businesses already exist in urban cores
across the country.12 However, while some of these businesses have
been successful for decades, most are under-capitalized. In a recent
book, Collaborative Capitalism in American Cities: Reforming Urban
Market Regulations, I used a case study methodology to examine
such businesses, focusing in particular on what I termed
“collaborative business networks.”13
Collaborative business
networks, which exist in many OZs, could certainly benefit from
financial investments. Thus, a highly efficacious use of OZ funding
would be to target such networks with long-term financial
investments. To develop this argument, it is important first to

10. Like the OZ program, the Enterprise Zones and Empowerment Zones
programs were tax benefit programs intended to channel private dollars into urban
cores, with the explicit intent to fuel business development among other goals.
Indeed, business and job development were the explicit goals of the Enterprise Zone
program, though it is widely described as producing mixed results. See Aprill, supra
note 2, at 1344; see also Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The
Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 324–25 (1999).
11. See Dyal-Chand & Rowan, supra note 3, at 901; see also Roger A. Clay, Jr. &
Susan R. Jones, What Is Community Economic Development?, in BUILDING
HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR
ADVOCATES, LAWYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 3, 11 (Roger A. Clay, Jr. & Susan R.
Jones eds., 2009). See generally Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community

Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic
Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (1997).
12. See generally DYAL-CHAND, supra note 1.
13. See id. at 1–13. Portions of this Part originally appeared in the book and are
being published with permission but have been revised for this Essay.
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describe such networks more fully and also to consider why they are
particularly well-suited to poverty alleviation efforts.
While collaborative business networks vary widely in their
structures, industries, locations, and other characteristics, there is a
clear pattern in their approach. As I wrote in the book,
The most important commonality is that the ventures involve
networks of businesses that collaborate with each other. Their
collaboration typically entails the sharing of key resources — such as
training and vocational education, labor, financing, market data,
suppliers and supplies, management expertise, and physical space —
as a means of reducing costs for the network as a whole and for each
business in the network. The sharing also typically makes use of
local ties to instill a strong connection to a local community. Often
this means that the businesses in the network have multiple “bottom
lines.” And the sharing within these networks consistently produces
long-term, stable income for the workers.14

In particular, collaborative business networks have six defining
features.15 While all of these criteria seem critical to the operation
and success of collaborative business networks, they do not
necessarily constitute an exhaustive list. The first three criteria
describe the particular form of collaboration of these networks. First,
businesses involved in collaborative business networks typically share
extensively within a closed network that operates in a discrete
market, defined both geographically and by industry or market
sector.16 Within this literal and figurative space, the businesses
involved in the network act in a coordinated or collective manner.17
They share a great deal of information and other resources that each
business would typically have to acquire and manage on its own, but
the businesses instead share within the entire network.18
A second core feature of such networks is that they involve one or
more institutions that serve as the glue among the businesses, helping
them to share and to act in a coordinated manner.19 Regularly such
institutions, which include local nonprofits, unions, and financial
institutions, act on the collective behalf of the small businesses. They

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 61–64.
See id.
Id.
See generally Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of
Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
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also regularly support the ability of such businesses to prioritize goals
beyond profit making.
The third feature, which also fundamentally defines the form of
collaboration, is that the businesses within the networks coordinate in
a way that lowers their individual costs of doing business.20 They also
regularly manage risk in a coordinated manner.21 Again, by doing so,
they externalize to the network as a whole the costs and risks that
each individual business would otherwise bear. It is reasonable to
expect that this behavior has helped many of the businesses involved
to perform better than they otherwise would have, including by
surviving for longer than the average start-up small business.22
The other three core features of such networks are not definitional
of the form of collaboration, but rather seem crucial to the success of
these networks in alleviating poverty, providing stability to their
workers, and even spurring stable economic development in urban
cores. The fourth feature is that the businesses involved in these
networks seem to prioritize goals other than, and in addition to, profit
making.23 These goals can include poverty alleviation, local hiring,
worker democracy, environmental sustainability, neighborhood
revitalization, and other priorities.24 The explicit prioritization of
these multiple bottom lines seems to drive many of the decisions of
these businesses, including at times by providing an incentive to
share.
The fifth feature is that the various stakeholders in the businesses,
including the management, workers, financing sources, customers,
and suppliers are predominantly insiders.25 The status of insider is
very often defined geographically.26 It is also regularly defined by
social and ethnic ties.27 While the multiple and close forms of
connection within these networks seem related to the successful
definition of market niches and other business imperatives, these
connections also provide a level of investment in, and even

20. DYAL-CHAND, supra note 1, at 66.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 51–55 (reviewing the literature on small business success in the
United States).
23. See id. at 66–67
24. See id.
25. Id. at 67.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 61.
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accountability to, the local communities in which these networks
operate.28
Finally, and relatedly, a core feature of these networks is that they
typically operate within a niche market or industry.29 Moreover,
these market niches typically are responsive to local community
needs, providing special products or services for such communities.30
Often the particular niches are also especially responsive to the
coordinated behavior of the businesses.31
As to the question of why collaborative business networks are so
well-suited to poverty alleviation, the answer is straightforward: these
networks tend to focus on maximizing value for the benefit of the
long-term, often low-income, residents of the area.32 The businesses
in the network cut the costs of doing business by sharing resources so
that each can have a better chance of success. The fact that they do
so alongside a commitment to hiring local and low-income residents
allows these successes to accrue to those in the urban core most in
need of the public and private investments in that network. This
approach has been especially efficacious in markets where
competition has traditionally involved cutting wages to remain
competitive in the pricing of services.33
Thus, this collaborative form of doing business is a better choice
for urban core contexts because of the multiple bottom lines that
involve a worker-centered approach. By supporting collaborative
business networks that have succeeded in promoting a fuller range of
goals, policymakers can respond more directly, accurately, and
successfully to the needs of residents in OZs. In short, collaborative
business networks are an ideal choice for Opportunity Zone
investments.
The final piece of the argument about an ideal strategy for
leveraging OZ funding is not only that the OZ program should target
collaborative business networks in OZs but that it should rely on
community banks both to find such networks and to channel OZ
funding to such networks. Indeed, my book examines the role of
community banks, focusing specifically on a case study in which a
major community development bank, ShoreBank in Chicago,

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 67.
Id. at 68–69.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 69.
See id. at 43. See generally id. at 17–49.
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supported a network of residential apartments-rehabbing businesses
for decades.34
As the research underlying the book suggests, banks situated
within collaborative business networks may well be the most powerful
means of supporting such networks, because community banks have a
unique potential to support the early development as well as the
ongoing stability of businesses participating in collaborative business
networks.35 For example, because of its multiple bottom lines,
ShoreBank worked as a collaborative partner alongside the rehabbing
businesses in the network.36 It provided a steady stream of capital
that was readily accessible without many of the usual constraints
imposed by private banks. It grew clients over the course of decades.
It tailored repayment terms to its borrowers’ needs, thereby making
debt financing less risky overall. In the United States, a community
bank of this sort may well be the ideal financing source for an urban
collaborative business network.37
By extension, it is reasonable also to conclude that banks situated
adjacent to such networks, even if not necessarily within them, are
well positioned to support the businesses in such networks and
beyond. Reliable studies indicate that community banks provide
significantly more financing to small businesses than their aggregate
lending share.38 Thus, it is likely that such banks are more informed
about local businesses than other financing sources would be.

34. See id. at 75–117.
35. Id. at 177, 260. For a far more extensive discussion of this issue, see Chapters
4, 7, and 10. See id.
36. Id. at 230.
37. See id. at 114 (explaining that, from “lowering critical costs, to prioritizing a
focus on local neighborhood development, to finding and exploiting an ideal niche
market, [Shore]Bank . . . did the work that several coordinating intermediaries
typically do together in national coordinated economies”).
38. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY 4-1 (2020),
https://www.fdic.gov/resources/community-banking/report/2020/2020-cbi-studyfull.pdf [https://perma.cc/79ND-GC78] (finding that, although “community banks
tend to be relatively small, . . . their lending far exceeds their aggregate lending
share”); see also Frank Sorrentino, Community Banks Play Critical Role in Helping
America’s Small Businesses Get Back to Business, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2020, 2:21 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/franksorrentino/2020/04/24/community-banks-playcritical-role-in-helping-americas-small-businesses-get-back-tobusiness/?sh=5c1fa4c514af [https://perma.cc/ZS6X-YB3X] (“[I]t’s no surprise that
community and regional banks were better positioned to service their clients
efficiently amidst COVID-19. Community banks have established relationships with
clients, can be nimble and operate through a relationship banking model, have deep
personal knowledge of clients and the communities they serve, which in turn allows
faster and more efficient engagement.”).

2021]

OPPORTUNITY ZONES

1235

Moreover, even if such banks are not aware of local networks, they
have the means to become aware of them, so long as they receive
proper resources and incentives. By hiring and training local loan
officers, who are from the communities they serve, community banks
can access local knowledge and networks in order to find businesses
that have the potential to succeed.39 Indeed, there is every reason to
believe that local loan officers would do a better job of finding worthy
borrowers, and accurately assessing their creditworthiness, than other
local institutions such as policy or planning agencies. Not only would
such officers have the ability to develop the necessary knowledge to
do so, they also would have the incentive.40 Thus, in terms of raw
impact, the best way to generate something akin to patient capital,
namely financing that is maintained “even in the face of adverse
short-term conditions,”41 for collaborative business networks may be
to channel financing through local banks.
II. REGULATORY REFORMS TO HARNESS THE POWER OF
COMMUNITY BANKS

This Part takes up the challenge of how best to harness the power
of community banks as a mechanism for providing direct, long-term
financial investments to collaborative business networks and other
successful — but undercapitalized — businesses in OZs. While
policymakers and scholars have raised promising regulatory
approaches, they lack the programmatic efficiency of providing OZ
funding directly to community banks, which is what this Essay
proposes. This approach also has the benefit of requiring minimal
and straightforward regulatory changes.
Presently, community banks and other lenders cannot be OZ
businesses.42 This is because a business can only qualify as a
“qualified opportunity zone business” if “substantially all of the

39. See Kylee Wooten, Measuring What Community Banks Bring to the Table,
ABA
BANKING
MKTG.
(Apr.
24,
2019),
https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2019/04/measuring-what-community-banks-bring-tothe-table/ [https://perma.cc/QS3W-TAD7]; Mark Scott, Making a Difference: The
Role of a Community Bank, SMART BUS. (Nov. 1, 2016, 12:14 AM),
https://www.sbnonline.com/article/making-difference-role-community-bank/
[https://perma.cc/52HR-48XK].
40. This is exactly the expectation that was articulated by ShoreBank employees
and borrowers on the basis of decades of experience. See DYAL-CHAND, supra note
1, at 80.
41. Richard Deeg & Iain Hardie, ‘What is Patient Capital and Who Supplies It?,’
14 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 627, 627 (2016).
42. See O’Neal & Hood, supra note 9.
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tangible property owned or leased by the [business] is qualified
opportunity zone business property.”43 This in turn, requires that less
than 5% of the property owned by an OZ business be “nonqualified
financial property.”44 However, a large portion of the assets of
community banks are loans, which are deemed “nonqualified
financial property” by the Internal Revenue Code.45
It is a significant lost opportunity that community banks cannot
qualify as OZ businesses, because they are unable to receive the
greatest and most direct benefit of the OZ program. Specifically, the
OZ program provides a vehicle for direct, long-term, financial
investments in businesses in areas designated as OZs.46 Because
community banks cannot qualify as OZ businesses, they cannot
receive these investments.
It is reasonable to ask why it is so important for banks to be OZ
businesses. What could justify investing directly in community banks
rather than in the businesses and residents to whom such banks
provide financial services? Indeed, these questions seem particularly
salient because community banks can still support the OZ program in
significant ways. For example, and perhaps most importantly,
community banks can boost the value of OZ investments by
providing additional financing to businesses that receive such
investments.47 Relatedly, banks can facilitate OZ financing to local
businesses by serving as advisors and brokers, especially when OZ
financing is part of a complex financing package that may involve
New Markets Tax Credits or other similar programs.48 They can also

43. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(i).
44. See id. § 1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(ii).
45. Id. § 1397C(e) (“For purposes of this section, the term ‘nonqualified financial
property’ means debt, stock, partnership interests, options, futures contracts, forward
contracts, warrants, notional principal contracts, annuities, and other similar property
specified in regulations . . . .”).
46. See RACHEL REILLY CAROLL, ENTER. CMTY., OPPORTUNITY ZONES
PROGRAM: AN EARLY OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM DETAILS AND WHAT’S AHEAD 2
(2018),
https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/download?fid=8856&nid=6212
[https://perma.cc/YM2A-3P8R]; see also John Sciarretti, What’s Next for
Opportunity
Zones?,
NOVOGRADAC
(Oct.
22,
2020,
12:00
AM),
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/whats-next-opportunity-zones
[https://perma.cc/BD43-GN5G].
47. David Black, Leveraging Qualified Opportunity Funds in Bank Community
Development Strategies, in COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS INVESTMENTS:
STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES WITH OPPORTUNITY ZONE INVESTMENTS 4, 5 (2021),
https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/communityaffairs/community-developments-investments/jan-2021/pub-ca-cdi-newsletter-jan2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW4T-895H].
48. See id.
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provide financing to other participants in an OZ transaction, such as
investors in an OZ Fund, or to the Fund itself.49 However, as the
remainder of this Part explains, direct OZ investments in community
banks are crucial because they increase both the likelihood that OZ
investments will reach the neediest recipients of OZ funds and the
efficiency with which such recipients can access OZ support.
Indeed, this recitation of the currently available modes for
community banks to participate in the OZ program also reveals its
major weaknesses: the OZ program is currently too indirect and too
complex to be an effective vehicle for investment in OZ areas.50 It is
time consuming and expensive for community banks to participate in
the indirect ways described above. For one thing, banks require
capital to provide financing for OZ deals. However, such capital is
hard to come by and often is not risk free. In 2019, the average asset
size of community banks, which the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) defines as banks that provide “traditional
banking services in their local communities,”51 was $0.47 billion.52
Meanwhile, the average asset size of noncommunity banks was $38.4
billion.53 This difference in asset size has typically meant that
community banks have to play it safe in their lending portfolios in
order to continue to meet safety and soundness requirements.54 Thus,
for example, even though community banks provide more debt
financing to small businesses than that provided by national banks,55
the majority of investments made by such banks still prioritize safety

49. See id. at 5.
50. See, e.g., Quinton, supra note 6.
51. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 38, at I.
52. Id. at 2–8.
53. Id. (“[F]rom 1984 to 2019 community banks grew roughly in line with the U.S.
economy. The average asset size of noncommunity banks in 2019, however, was more
than 38 times their average size in 1984, since their growth during that 35-year period
far outpaced that of the broader economy . . . . Between 2012 and 2019, the share of
banking industry assets held at community banks declined from 14 percent to 12
percent of the total, down from a high of 38 percent in 1984.”).
54. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed
to Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks,
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249, 341–42 (2015); see also Clifford Rosenthal, Credit
Unions, Community Development Finance, and the Great Recession, 22, 43, 46–47
(Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2012-01, 2012).
55. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 38, at VII (“Despite holding only 15
percent of total industry loans in 2019, community banks held 36 percent of the
banking industry’s small business loans.”).
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and soundness principles in ways that overly limit their ability to take
risks in supporting small businesses.56
Moreover, while banks have the expertise to serve as advisors for
OZ deals, the financial incentive to do so is lacking.57 Meanwhile, the
need for community banks to serve as advisors bespeaks the difficulty
that local businesses and residents have in accessing OZ funding
without the help of knowledgeable advisors.58
Recent data about who exactly has been able to make productive
use of OZ financing bear out my analysis. Perhaps most troublingly,
very few Black-owned businesses have been able to take advantage of
OZ financing.59 One commentator likened OZ funding to the
Paycheck Protection Plan in that it “failed to reach many minority
small-businessowners, who lack banking relationships.”60 Brett
Theodos of the Urban Institute captured the overarching sentiment of
investors evaluating OZ opportunities: “What we found, looking at
community benefit projects, is they’re just hard to do, period.”61 The
perceived difficulty, an obvious version of the long-entrenched
information asymmetries that worry lenders and investors in urban
cores,62 has resulted in very few investments in businesses that are
truly local.63
Similarly, the apparent assumption made by federal policymakers
that community banks could lend their expertise to create an efficient
pipeline of OZ financing directly to local businesses also seems
unfounded. A November 2020 article in Bloomberg Tax opened with
the following observation: “Lenders that have historically provided
capital to underserved areas — the focus of the opportunity zone tax
breaks — have struggled to get involved in the burgeoning market for

56. See, e.g., Lee Grayson, Community Bank vs. Commercial Bank, CHRON,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/community-bank-vs-commercial-bank-42524.html
[https://perma.cc/KJ92-Q96U] (last visited Sept. 5, 2021) (“Community banks
frequently operate under legal restrictions to avoid investments that put your
business money at risk.”).
57. Wilmarth, supra note 54, at 341–42.
58. See Quinton, supra note 6.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See generally Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment:
A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1561 (1995); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets
with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).
63. See THEODOS ET AL., supra note 5, at V–VII. “OZ incentives are not
structured to encourage resident or community engagement . . . .” Id. at V.
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the tax-advantaged investments.”64 As the article described, of the
1,100 community development financial institutions (CDFIs) in the
United States, “just a handful have managed to participate, and they
cite a laundry list of barriers, including an inability to take
investments themselves.”65 The article cited the design of the OZ
program and other IRS regulations as impeding access for CDFIs.66
Meanwhile, OZ financing has generated billions of dollars, much of
which has not reached the neediest of communities despite giving OZ
investors significant tax benefits.67
These reports about the early effects of the OZ program all lead to
the conclusion that it would make a tremendous difference to allow
community banks to qualify as OZ businesses. As one commentator
has noted: “Unless you have more specific targeting of who the
beneficiaries are, it’s not going to work.”68
“Someone needs to underwrite the underwriters.” This was a
phrase that originated among the managers of ShoreBank, which was
the biggest community financial development institution in the
country before it closed in 2010.69 Although this phrase originated
well before the OZ program was created, it captures the need for
access to low-risk financing for those institutions that are best
positioned to provide financing to long-time residents of OZ
communities. To demonstrate the enormous utility of underwriting
the underwriters using OZ funding, let me address each of these
pieces in turn, beginning with the utility of direct OZ financing for
community banks and then turning to the importance of lowering
risk.
Currently community banks, including CDFIs, have significant
capital limitations that prevent them from fulfilling the roles that the
OZ program seems to expect of them — namely to provide financing

64.
65.
66.
67.

O’Neal & Hood, supra note 9.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor
Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/2P8X-SH84].
68. O’Neal & Hood, supra note 9 (quoting Michael Swack, director of the
University of New Hampshire’s Center for Impact Finance).
69. See DYAL-CHAND, supra note 1, at 100; see also James E. Post & Fiona S.
Wilson, Too Good to Fail, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 66, 66 (2011),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/too_good_to_fail# [https://perma.cc/SSW6-HJ29] (“On
Aug. 20, 2010, the Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation closed
ShoreBank, the nation’s first and leading community bank . . . .”).
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that facilitates and supports direct OZ funding.70 Despite these
constraints, federal and state programs continue to target community
banks with other forms of funding and assistance. The recent passage
of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act
is a noteworthy example because it allocates $12 billion to CDFIs.71
However, this financing is not risk free. This allocation will be
distributed to individual CDFIs as debt that must be repaid.72
Moreover, the money comes with additional strings that limit the
opportunity to create incentives and spread risks, such as restrictions
on executive compensation, share buybacks, and dividend payments.73
Thus, while the CARES Act allocation is a powerful beginning, it
does not remove the very real constraints on CDFIs to meet safety
and soundness requirements and avoid risk. These limitations of the
CARES Act can be expected to translate directly into fewer dollars
for local small businesses, which again are perceived as riskier lending
targets, whether rightly or wrongly.
The second important aspect of underwriting the underwriters is
closely related: it is crucial to remove some of the risks just described.
It is essential for federal policy to encourage investment by local
banks in local businesses rather than to discourage such investment
by imposing requirements that are meant to avoid risk. What is
required today is a set of banking regulations that acknowledge the
real risk of lending to small, local businesses but that develop ways to
manage such risk. While such regulations may well take time to
develop in order to balance the interests of both lenders and
borrowers, the obvious beginning point is to find ways to provide
financing to lenders with no, or at least fewer, repayment strings
attached.
This is where the OZ program could make an enormous difference.
If such regulations were modified to allow long-term investments in

70. See supra text accompanying notes 51–56.
71. See $12 Billion in Cares Act for CDFIs, CREDIT UNION STRATEGIC PLAN.
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.creditunionstrategicplanning.com/post/12-billion-incares-act-for-cdfis [https://perma.cc/5T3D-USJ3].
72. See id.
73. See Sarah G. Lutzke, Consolidated Appropriations Act Sets Aside $12 Billion
for
CDFIs
and
MDIs,
WIPFLI
(Jan.
20,
2021),
https://www.wipfli.com/insights/articles/fi-covid-19-caa-provides-12-billion-for-cdfifund-and-ecip [https://perma.cc/V8MZ-3Y9X]. While these restrictions are doubtless
intended for the laudable purpose of ensuring that the funds are used for community
development, they preclude opportunities for creative financing and are imposed on
(at least some) institutions that likely have proven track records of deep community
engagement.
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“the underwriters,” the risks of lending could be significantly
alleviated for community banks. It would be a means of leveraging
the CARES Act allocation to community banks, providing both a soft
guaranty of repayment as well as additional capital to support lending
efforts. It would eliminate the often-unnecessary hurdles imposed on
both banks and local businesses that currently impede access to OZ
funds.74 Most importantly, it would allow funds to be funneled
directly to communities.
As the range of efforts to increase OZ participation for community
banks suggests, as a regulatory matter, it should be a straightforward
proposition to allow community banks to qualify as OZ businesses.75
The primary regulatory changes would be made to Internal Revenue
Code provisions concerning OZs. In particular, I would propose
three changes. First, the definition of “qualified opportunity zone
business property” should be amended to include “local” loans.
“Local” here should be defined as commercial loans made to small
businesses owned by individuals who have been residents of an OZ
for ten or more years, as well as residential loans to such residents.
Such a definitional change would allow loans, which are typically the
largest asset held by community banks, to qualify as OZ business
property. It would also increase the incentives for such banks to
make loans to local businesses that might previously have been
perceived as too risky.76
Second, either the Internal Revenue Code itself or IRS guidance
should include special opportunities and incentives for community
banks embedded in collaborative business networks to qualify as OZ
businesses and to benefit from such participation. For example, IRS
guidance could provide for a streamlined process for community
banks to qualify as OZ businesses for a period of years for any local
loans they make if they can meet certain criteria at the point of
making the first loan. Such criteria could include capitalization and
74. See supra text accompanying notes 51–56.
75. See O’Neal & Hood, supra note 9 (“There are already calls from some
Democrats to make changes. A bill (H.R. 7262) from Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.)
would allow CDFIs to take opportunity fund investments by designating them
businesses eligible for such financing. Still, only Democrats have backed the measure
so far. Think tanks and other organizations unsuccessfully lobbied the IRS and
Treasury to give CDFIs this big exception from some of the policy’s requirements
while officials were crafting the rules in 2018 and 2019.”).
76. See id. (“While impact-minded opportunity funds certainly exist, the
incentives grow with profits, not with hiring, wages, or other measurable community
impact — making already hot, fast-growing neighborhoods an easier play.”); see also
THEODOS ET AL., supra note 5, at 23 (explaining that a company was unable to raise
OZ equity because advisors saw the investment as “risky” and “oddball”).
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asset levels and other markers for proving safety and soundness, but
they should also include proof of long-term investment in the
community.77 The idea here would be to reduce the difficulty of
making a stream of successive OZ investments in local businesses,
thereby increasing the stability and accessibility of local capital for
such businesses. As for incentives to the banks themselves, these
should include tax incentives that are useful to community banks,
which cannot currently make much use of incentives that target
equity investments.78
Third, as I have discussed elsewhere, banking regulations issued by
the Federal Reserve Board should be amended to allow community
banks and their parent holding companies to make both debt and
equity investments in local small businesses.79 While this may seem
like a radical suggestion, current regulations already permit bank
holding companies to make equity investments in community
development projects.80 Thus, the only necessary rule change should
be to allow such investments in the same projects that also receive
debt financing from the bank subsidiaries of such holding
companies.81 This need has already been identified by industry
participants: “One of the most commonly cited problems for CDFIs
trying to get involved in the market is that opportunity funds make
equity investments, taking ownership of the businesses and projects
they’re financing, rather than providing loans as CDFIs often do.”82
By removing the constraint on simultaneous debt and equity
financing, banking regulations can provide greater incentive and
support for investment in OZs and, more broadly, across a range of
urban cores.

77. For detailed discussion of such criteria, see DYAL-CHAND, supra note 1, at 85,
92, 257–60.
78. O’Neal & Hood, supra note 9 (“‘A new tax incentive is needed — one where
the decision on what to finance rests with entities that are accountable to the
community: community development financial institutions,’ said Lisa Mensah,
president and CEO of the Opportunity Finance Network, an association of more
than 300 CDFIs.”).
79. See DYAL-CHAND, supra note 1, at 258–59.
80. 12 C.F.R. § 225.127 (2019) (allowing bank holding companies to invest in
“projects designed primarily to promote community welfare” and “community
development corporations”).
81. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany,
Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1949–51 (1993) (contrasting
German banks from U.S. banks in this regard).
82. O’Neal & Hood, supra note 9.
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CONCLUSION

By harnessing the potential for community banks to serve as
engines of financial support for successful, small, local businesses in
OZs, the Opportunity Zone program can make a world of difference.
Crucially, it can support poverty alleviation and the development of
stable jobs, thereby fulfilling the uniquely important roles that tax
benefit programs such as this have been created to fill. The
regulatory and programmatic changes required to implement such a
strategy are straightforward. All that is required now is the political
will.

